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In this article two simple Richardson-type anns race models are applied to the military 
build-ups of Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Syria, and Israel. Time-series data on major weapon 
system inventories and capabilities of these nations and on their military manpower were 
collected for this study, and measurement procedures are discussed briefly. The periods 
from 1956 to 1967 and from 1967 to 1973 are analyzed separately to detect changes of 
reaction patterns from one arms race to the other. Ordinary and generalized least squares 
regression are used as estimation techniques. Empirical findings are compared across 
arms races, nations, armed services, weapon systems, models, and indicators. Many 
reaction patterns which initially look significant are wiped out if autocorrelation of 
residuals is taken into account by generalized least squares regrcssion. Thus, the first 
period is shown tobe more of a mutual arms „race," whereas in the second period only 
Israel is seen as reacting to Arab inventories, capabilities, and manpower. The only 
exception is an Israeli-Syrian missile-boat race between 1967 and 1973. Generally it can 
be concluded that by disaggregating overall military postures into individual services for 
which multiple indicators are available, it is possible for arms race research to identify 
reaction processes which not only would have gone unnoticed in aggregate data but also 
come closer to real-world decision processes. 
The Middle East is at present regarded by many as that part 
of the world in which large-scale conflict between the super-
powers is most likely to originate. One event in support of that 
view was the worldwide alert of American f orces during the 
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Arab-Israeli war of October 1973. Not the least important 
factor in establishing the Middle East as the world's primary 
trouble spot is the sheer mass of sophisticated weaponry avail-
able to Israel and her Arab enemies. Should fighting break out 
again on a level of intensity comparable to that of 1973, super-
power invoJvement-at least to supply replacement of losses, 
spare parts, ammunition, and expert advice-would be unavoid-
able from the first hour of combat. Since rearmament after the 
war took place in a matter of weeks rat her than months in Israel 
as well as in Iraq, Syria, and Egypt, and since these countries now 
command more formidable arsenals than ever bef ore (Kemp, 
J975; Tahtinen, 1974), all this is even more relevant today than 
it was in 1973. 
In this situation it is not surprising that a number of studies 
have been devoted to conflict interactions in the Middle East 
(Wilkenfeld et al., 1972; Burrowes and Garriga-Pico, 1974; 
McCormick, 1975) and specifically to the arms race charac-
teristics of the military build-ups in the interwar periods. In a 
study of military spending before 1967, Lambelet (197l)finds the 
effects of reactivity to be comparatively low when contrasted 
with those of economic growth. Controlling f or the high corre-
lation of real armament expenditures with time by de-trending 
Jinearly, Rattinger (l974a) found fairly high interaction between 
Israeli and total Arab defense expenditures between the wars of 
1956 and 1967; for the period from 1967 to 1973 no significant 
results were obtained. 
The major weakness of these studies is their f ocus on aggre-
gate defense expenditures. Formost nations in the area, military 
spending is a rather meaningless indicator of capability because 
of the complex interplay of military aid, regular arms procure-
ment, gifts and nonmaterial forms of payment by political alle-
giance to arms donors, and the like. This fact-together with the 
high degree of hostility and comparatively good information on 
hardware levels-makes defense spending less important as a 
perceptual variable in the Middle East context. 
These limitations on the use of budgetary data have led 
Mihalka ( 1975) to fit a modified Richardson model to capability 
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data on Arab and Israeli combat aircraft inventories from 1949 
to 1968. The restriction to aircraft assumes that arms races take 
place in "dominant" weapon systems (Huntington, 1958) and 
that combat aircraft fill that role in the Middle East. While 
Mihalka's work is highly innovative with respect to capability 
measurement, his interpretation of empirical results is afflicted 
by some serious shortcomings. Most important is that bis major 
conclusion that arms accumulation in the Middle East is mainly a 
product of bureaucratic incrementalism does not f ollow from his 
data analysis. • 
The purpose of the present article is to explore the extent to 
which military build-ups in the Middle East can be explained by 
action-reaction processes as expressed in Richardson's model 
and in a modification of this model which is introduced below. 
Its analysis goes beyond previous research by fitting these two 
models not to budget data but to a comprehensive set of inven-
tory, capability, and manpower data on the armies, air forces, 
and navies of Israel and her main Arab opponents, Egypt, Iraq, 
Jordan, and Syria. To avoid blurring possible historical break-
points in reaction patterns, the periods leading up to the wars in 
1967 and 1973 will be analyzed separately. Their short duration 
imposes severe constraints on the complexity of modeling so that 
some important determinants of military expansion in Middle 
East countries-like internal developments in these nations, 
inter-Arab rifts and rivalries, and external stimuli and con-
straints-cannot be incorporated in the two models to be pre-
sented now. 
1. Mihalka determines the extent of incrementaJism by inspecting the estimated 
coefficient of the lagged endogenous variable in the unrestricted reduced form of his 
modeJ. This coefficient stands for (J - a1 + c1) in the restricted reduced form, where c1 is 
the incrementalist growth constant and a1 is the reaction coefficient (Mihalka, 1975: 25). 
By confounding both effects Mihalka might interpret as strong incrementalism what in 
fact is low incrementalism coupled with low reactivity, and as low incrementalism the 
strong presence of both reactivity and incrementalism. Another weakness of Mihalka's 
study is the use of data from 1949 to 1968 without allowing for a brcakpoint in 1956. The 
virtual absence of Arab-lsraeli reaction might thus simply be a statistical artifact. My 
impression from a conversation with the author is that he is aware of these points, even 
though this is not documented in bis study. 
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Models of Arms Accumu/ation 
No extensive analytical discussion of arms race models will 
be provided here, as at least the first model to be applied in this 
article is well known and its heuristic utility is generally accepted. 
Our first model is adapted from Richardson's ( 1960) basic two-
nation model. lt states that each state in an arms race would want 
to increase its military capability from one year to the next in 
proportion to the accumulated capability of the other side but 
is restrained by the cost of its own weaponry:2 
Xi - Xi-1 =k1 Yt-i - a1Xi-1+el(i=1, 2, · · ·) [I] 
Xt denotes the military strength of one side to the arms race in 
time t, Yt-i that of its opponent in t - i. k1 is a reaction constant 
(the "defense coefficient"), a1 corresponds to Richardson's 
"expense and fatigue" coefficient, e1 is a random error term with 
mean zero and finite standard deviation, and i stands f or the 
time lag of reaction to the opponent's capability. In keeping with 
the econometric literature ( e.g., Kmenta, 1971: 539) the co-
efficients kt and a1 will not be estimated directly from equation l. 
Instead, equation 1 is solved for Xt to yield the multiple re-
gression equation 2 which is the first model to be estimated. 
Equations l and 2 share one fundamental shortcoming with 
most arms race models in attributing the "fallacy of the last 
move" to arms racing nations. Only current and past-but not 
projected-f orce levels are assumed to enter into a state's deci-
sion concerning the amount to increase its capability. The only 
effort to cope with this problem in the context of arms races is 
the model advanced by Lagerstrom (1968). Unfortunately, this 
model cannot be applied to the Middle East arms competition 
2. Difference equations are used instead of the original differential equations 
because of the discrete character of the data. 
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as it requires the estimation of more parameters than is feasible 
with our short series of data. 
Projections of f orce levels can be allowed f or in a simpler way 
by treating the change of one side's capability as dependent upon 
the corresponding increment f or the adversary at the same or at 
some previous time, as is f ormally done in equation 3:3 
- a2Xi- t + e3 (i = 0, 1, ... ) 
(3) 
The generality of equation 3 is restricted by the implicit 
assumption that the effect of the enemy's arms vanishes if and 
only if their levels remain constant from t - i - l to t - i. This 
restriction can be overcome by respecifying equation 3 to the eff ect 
that not thechangein t-ioftheopponenfscapabilitybutitsdevi-
ation from an "acceptable" increment is the crucial variable 
producing a behavioral reaction. If the "acceptable" growth 
rate of the opponent's capability is (k4 - l) model 3 becomes:4 
[41 
3. lt should be noted, incidentally, that behavior according to model 3 on the part 
of all participants in an arms race would lead to the second type of dynamic equilibrium 
the author has analyzed elsewhere (Rattinger, l974b: 498-S04). 
4. With k. - l as the "acceptable" growth rate, (k.. - l)Y, _ 1-, is the "acceptable" 
increment of the enemy's arms from t - i - 1 to t - i. As the observed increment is Y, _ ; -
Y, - 1 - 1, its deviation from „acceptable" change is 
Y, - 1 - Y 1 - , - 1 - (k.. - l)Y, - , _ 1 = Y, - 1 - k. Y 1 - 1 - 1. 
In highly competitive situations k. - 1 is likely to be negative so that k. will be below 
unity. This implies that one side would have to disarm unilaterally to prevent the other 
side fri>m increasing its armamentS in response. 
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By solving for Xt we have as our second regression equation: 
~ = b3~-l + b4 Yt-i + b5 Yt-i-1 
+ e5 (i = 0, 1, ... ) 
(Sl 
Bef ore proceeding to measurement and data, three further 
points concerning our models will be made. First, one might 
argue for an exclusion of "ex.pense and fatigue" terms from 
equations 1, 3, and 4, as the real ''restraining" factors in the 
Middle East might be the (un)willingness of suppliers to deliver 
hardware desired by their clients (see Milstein, 1970) as weil as 
disagreement between both on what political "prices'' should be 
paid (SIPRI, 1971: 506~559). In spite of the heavy load of mili-
tary preparations on the economies of Israel and the Arab 
nations (see Askari and Corbo, 1974; Gottheil, 1974), a simple 
cost constraint in the style of Richardsonts model might thus be 
inappropriate. 5 This issue can be clarified by inspecting the esti-
mated values of b1 and bJ. If Richardson's perspective is bome 
out by the data, b1 and b3 should be weil below unity as b1 = 
1 - a1 and b1 =. l - a3. 
A second point concerns the interpretation of equations 2 and 
5 as incrementalist models. Both are autoregressive as the lagged 
endogenous variable X1-1 is part of their right~hand sides. In his 
recent study of the Middle East, Mihalka treats similar auto-
regressive terms as representations of an incrementalist bureau-
cratic drive towards the expansion of armaments. This interpre-
tation is open to some doubts. Even though theoretical argu-
ments-f or which there is also some empirical evidence (Crecine, 
1971; Rattinger, 1975b, 1975c)-attribute defense spending to 
bureaucratic incre-mentalism (Wildavsky, 1964; Crecine, 1969), 
their extension to capability data in high-conflict situations is 
S. An elaborate ••expense and fatigue"tcrm ofthe kind proposed by Caspary(l967) 
might be more appropriate to the situation in the Middle East. Jts introduction would, 
however, aggravate the degrees of freedom problem even further. 
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anything but straightf orward, since these data typically exhibit 
discontinuous growth patterns. lt is therefore necessary to dis-
tinguish conceptually, theoretically, and empirically between 
"arms races" in military spending on the one hand, and in inven-
tories, capabilities, and manpower on the other. A model which 
proves valid for the one type of arms race is not automatically 
the best approach f or the other type. The Richardson model 
probably possesses least validity for "expenditure races," 
whereas the bureaucratic model is probably least useful in ex-
plaining the growth of capability. 
This implies that autoregressive terms cannot, in all reduced 
forms of difference equation models (and by extension, differ-
ential equation models), be regarded as markers for incremen-
talism if substantial considerations do not warrant this interpre-
tation. With the outbreak of war as an imminent and permanent 
contingency, as it is in the Middle East, applying the model of 
burea ucratic incrementalism to capabilities makes little sense as 
it assumes that the defense apparatus has been able to settle down 
to a comfortably monotonous pace (Crecine, 1969). In this article 
the growth of capabilities will therefore not be ascribed to 
bureaucratic momentum even if the reaction component is 
absent. 
Finally, it should be explained why the increasingly popular 
approach of specifying arms race models together with their 
parameter values a priori on the basis of historical information 
about the specific case (Moll, 1974; Lambelet, 1974) is not pur-
sued here, even though it seems attractive with our short series of 
data. The first reason is that this approach is too far to the one 
extreme of a continuum ranging from purely theoretical exer-
cises to entirely descriptive and atheoretical-though historically 
weil informed-post festum curve fitting. The second reason 
underlines the first one in that the pertinent inf ormation is 
simply unavailable f or the Middle East. There has generally been 
little declaratory policy as to whose armaments a given state has 
regarded as the major threat at a given time and what its stand-
ards for comparing forces have been. 
- TADLE 1 "" Inventories 1957-1973 c::> CO -
YEAR 1957 58 59 60 61 62 6J 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 7J 
EGYPT 330 340 365 380 410 520 660 790 940 970 370 710 925 1425 1650 2060 1955 
U) IRAQ 125 ISS 24S 280 32S 345 395 430 450 480 500 S75 S7S 685 92S 925 IOSS 
11111 
JORDAN J20 ISO JSO ISO ISO ISO 150 150 200 300 100 230 309 300 290 344 420 z 
< 
SYRIA 150 2SO 400 435 435 435 435 ... 43S 43S 435 400 430 450 780 800 1190 1270 
ISRAEL 320 340 360 380 420 450 500 570 640 800 990 800 1020 1050 107S 1430 1700 
EGYPT 38 170 170 170 240 270 30S 35S 3SS 430 225 400 3S2 463 553 568 570 
~t IRAQ 31 55 69 80 97 104 117 136 154 183 150 193 193 207 209 194 224 111< 
JORDAN 16 16 18 18 12 12 )4 )6 20 20 0 16 23 30 35 47 :ifj 50 
oa: SYRIA 34 64 64 64 64 64 71 71 71 76 25 145 145 200 210 240 334 u-< 
ISRAEL 120 130 152 169 179 207 220 236 257 250 220 235 275 330 368 426 482 
U) EGYPT 42 64 66 67 69 73 73 A. 78 78 90 94 100 108 106 J05 106 100 
i SYRJA 13 IS 15 15 J5 IS 15 IS 17 23 23 26 26 26 26 25 29 
U) 
ISRAEL 23 23 23 25 25 25 24 24 24 26 23 20 20 31 33 35 41 
O:ui EGYPT 10 14 16 17 19 23 25 30 30 40 44 50 55 S4 54 52 52 OA. ...,_ 
SYRIA 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 7 7 9 9 9 9 II 14 <:Z: 
:i U) 
ISRAEL 7 7 6 8 7 7 6 6 6 8 7 7 6 16 16 14 J5 
SOURCES: Table 1 has been compiled by aggregation from the inventory tables in Rattinger (197Sd). In preparing those tables, data from 1966 
onward have been taken from Mili1ary Balance. Data for previous years have been derived from statistics on arms transfers to the Middle East (SIPRI, 
1971, 1975), allowing for depreciation of inventories according to Leiss and Kemp's (1970: 366) formula. All data have been chec.ked against Dupuy 
(1974), Jane's Aircraft, Jane's Fighting Ships, Jane's Weapon Systems, Statesman's Year-Book, and Weyers Flottentaschenbuch. Whenever 
sources were incongruous, information from the latter group of sources has been preferred. 
Rattinger /WAR TO WAR TO WAR [509) 
Measurement and Data 
INVENTORIES 
In a previous research effort annual weapons inventories for 
Israel, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and Syria for the period from 1957 
to 197 4 were derived from a variety of sources (Rattinger, l 975d). 
Data collection had to be restricted to major weapon systems 
like tanks, combat aircraft, and fighting ships, because data on 
lesser systems are unavailable or contradictory or unreliable. In 
measuring the capability of a state's army by counting its number 
of tanks, one assumes, of course, that it maintains a force mix 
within its army allowing it to employ its tank f orce with a reason-
able degree of effectiveness, and similar assumptions have to be 
made about air f orce and navy inventories. These assumptions 
seem realistic for Middle East countries, since the generally high 
probability of war has prevented them from stocking up on major 
weapon systems without taking care of their integration into the 
remainder of their f orces. 
Table 1 gives annual inventories of tanks, combat aircraft, 
fighting ships, and major ships for the five countries in this 
study. Armored personnel carriers and self-propelled artillery are 
not counted as tanks, regardless of armor and armament. "Com-
bat aircraft" includes armed trainers in the case of Israel and 
aircraft in storage in the case of Egypt, but consistently excludes 
helicopters. "Fighting ships" do not include landing craft. 
N umbers of "major ships" are given, as it might be suspected that 
these vessels (particularly missile boats) have played an im-
portant role of their own in the second race. Numbers of"major 
ships" are arrived at by excluding minesweepers, torpedo boats, 
and all patrol boats not armed with missiles from the totals. 
CAPABILITIES 
For deriving the time series of capability indices in Table 2, 
capability indices f or all major weapon systems in the inven-
-V\ -0 TABLE 2 
Capabilities 1957-1973 
YEAR l9S1 SB S9 60 61 62 6J 64 65 66 
EGYPT 1390.6 1416.2 1480.0 1518.4 1738.4 2173.4 3803.4 3380.9 4168.4 4325.9 
"" IRAQ 352.0 447.8 87.S.3 1036.6 120.S.6 1385.3 1385.8 1740.8 1815.0 1927.5 IO! JORDAN 415.6 607.0 607.0 607.0 607.0 607.0 607.0 607.0 926.0 1564.0 ;z: < 
SYRIA 483.0 858.0 1645.5 1- 1735.I 1735.1 1735.1 1735.1 1735.1 1735.1 1735. l 
ISRAEL 838.0 899.2 960.4 1021.6 1144.0 1235.8 1388.8 1769.0 2215.8 3000.5 
EGYPT 46540 J38200 138200 138200 161300 380500 684300 809300 809300 1003200 
1- li: IRAQ 19870 78900 83170 103600 219540 220650 281490 360260 4274JO 520880 << IQ°' JORDAN 8320 27280 47280 47280 44160 44160 51520 58880 73600 73600 2t.i oac SYRIA 10720 19720 19720 19720 19720 19720 33300 33300 33300 67800 v-< 
282630 359500 438570 ISRAEL 66800 85700 109760 122470 123470 203700 428260 
"" EGYPT Jl.68 16.46 18.86 19.19 20.71 23.42 23.99 25.18 25.18 31.56 a. J.02 5 SYRIA .80 .95 .95 .95 .95 .95 .95 .95 2.40 
III 
ISRAEL 5.46 5.46 4.68 5.04 4.33 4.33 3.55 3.55 3.55 5.ll 
°'III EGYPT 9.78 13.06 15.46 15.79 17.31 20.02 20.64 21.84 21.84 28.05 Oa. 
.06 .06 .06 .06 .06 t.30 
..,_ 
SYRIA .06 .06 .06 .06 <:Z:: 
:::Et11 ISRAEL 4.70 4.70 3.92 4.28 3.50 3.50 2.73 2.73 2.73 4.29 
T ABLE 2 (Continued) 
YEAR 1967 68 69 70 71 72 73 
EGYPT 1421.S 2977.9 4079.3 6189.3 741S.O 9549.S 9813.8 
(1) IRAQ 2130.1 2556.1 2556.1 3194.2 4566.2 4566.2 5203.7 w z JORDAN 472.0 1063.6 1440.3 1416.0 1385.4 1767.6 2004.4 < 
1- SYRIA 1645.S 1939.8 2137.S 3789.3 3821.3 5733.8 5861.8 
ISRAEL 4125.5 3006.1 4119.9 4167.9 4394.7 6009.1 1390.S 
EGYPT 324250 666400 753940 969170 1156960 1197760 1306500 
1- t: IRAQ 440600 S42S10 542510 546710 618380 584060 62)240 << 
III ai: JORDAN 0 48680 80920 106680 1241SO 168310 178420 ::r (,,) 
oai: SYRIA 19800 202200 202200 312600 337600 346600 600060 v-< 
ISRAEL 379750 381350 520000 1556370 2662560 3239800 35197'0 
rll EGYPT 32.61 35.17 37.18 36.31 36.22 35.98 35.48 a. SYRIA 2.41 3.11 3.11 3.11 3.H 3.JJ 4.71 
= rll ISRAEL 4.33 4.19 4.03 9.65 9.70 8.91 9.43 
111:(1) EGYPT 29.10 32.33 33.36 32.67 32.67 32.04 32.04 
011. SYRIA 1.31 1.93 1.93 1.93 1.93 2.56 3.73 <= :r rll ISRAEL 3.60 3.60 3.42 9.0J 9.0J 8.12 8.59 
- SOURCES: Rattinger (197Sd); capability scorcs for individual weapon systems available from the author. (A .... -
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tories of Middle East countries between 1956 and 1973 had tobe 
available along with the detailed inventory tables from which 
Table 1 was compiled. Since the capability indices used in this 
study have received extensive discussion elsewhere (Rattinger, 
l 975a: 234-310), only a brief overview will be given. 
From the judgments of military experts on the effectiveness 
of a large number of ground weapon systems and combat aircraft 
over a wide variety of missions, the properties of speed, combat 
radius, and payload were identified as the most frequently 
applied criteria. This finding coincides with the results of an 
independent factor analytic study on the dimensions of the tech-
nical characteristics of combat aircraft (Mihalka, 1975). In this 
latter study, factor scores for an offensive and a defensive com-
ponent were combined to yield overall capability indices. In 
contrast, the simple product of speed, payload, and combat 
radius will be used here as an index. 6 
Preliminary tests of validity against expert judgments suggest 
that this index might be a reasonable alternative to factor scores, 
which are heavily influenced by the composition of the sample 
from which they are derived. The main problem in applying this 
capability index in the present case was the difficulty in obtain-
ing meaningf ul data on "payload" for naval vessels. In keeping 
with the general thrust of the index, all ships were therefore 
rank-ordered on a scale from 1 (for lowest) to 8 according to main 
armament, and the rank of each ship was treated as its payload 
score. This does not impair the generality of the index, since it 
is not meant for comparing sea, air, and ground systems. 1 Aggre-
gated annual capability scores for tanks, combat aircraft, fight-
ing ships, and major ships are contained in Table 2. 
6. The intercorrelation between the two indices for all combat aircraft in Middle 
East inventories from 1957 to 1973 is .89. A list with technical characteristics and index 
values of all major weapon systems operated by Middle East nations since 1957 is 
avaiJable from the author. 
7. The trade-off between weapon systems of different services is probably the most 
severe obstacle to a general approach to the measurement of capability. A good illustra-
tion of all the problems involved is the study of Weiner (1968). 
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MAN POWER 
Man power data for the total armed f orces of our five countries 
and for their individual services from 1967 to 1974 are given in 
Table 3. Paramilitary forces, police forces, and reserves are 
excluded. Man power data f or the first arms race will not be 
analyzed for two reasons. First, these data are available from the 
same set of sources only back to 1961, and combining data from 
different sources in time series is always a risky enterprise since 
they might be biased differently. Second, data obtained from 
other sources (Stateman's Year-Book~ Hurewitz, 1969) suggest 
that the major changes in manpower levels in the Middle East 
have taken place before 1957 or after 1967. 
Some Empirical Findings 
Models 2 and 5 were estimated for all five countries for the 
periods from 1956 to 1967 and from 1967 to 1973 by ordinary 
least squares (OLS) regression. The two arms races were ana-
lyzed separately because it seems unrealistic to expect that 
reaction patterns before and after 1967 have been identical. 
Lumping races together could 1ead to spurious findings or wash 
out reaction patterns that are significant but different in both 
races. 8 
Both models were estimated f or each of the four Arab coun-
tries individually reacting to Israel's arms and force levels. In 
addition, total Arab inventories, capabilities, and manpower 
were treated as being dependent upon those of Israel. For Israel, 
five variants of each model were estimated from each set of data 
with the forces of Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and Syria, as well as 
aggregated Arab strength as explanatory variables. Aggregate 
8. lndiscriminately lumping together different races between different parties is the 
dccisive problem with Milstein and Mitchell's (l 969) naval simulation. See also foot-
note 1. 
-V. - TABLE 3 • 
Manpower (in 1000) 1967-1973• ------- ~--
YEAR 1967 68 69 70 71 12 73 ---- ---
EGYPT 154 184 184 254 279 28S 260 
> IRAQ 70 70 70 85 85 90 90 
::E JORDAN 30 53 53 58 58 65 68 a: 
< SYRIA so so 60 75 100 100 120 
ISRAEL 60 61.S 61.S 61.5 61.5 61.5 94.S 
III EGYPT lS 15 15 20 2S 25 23 
u IRAQ 10 10 6 7.5 8.25 9.8 9.8 a: 
0 JORDAN l.7S 1.75 1.75 2 2 4 4.6 u. 
a: SYRIA 9 9 9 10 10 10 10 < 
ISRAEL 9 9 9 9 9 11 16 ---------
> EGYPT II 12 12 14 14 15 15 > SYRIA l.S l.5 1.5 1.75 l.75 1.95 2 < z ISRAEL 4 4.5 4.S 4.S 4.5 4.5 4.5 - -
~ 
< IRAQ 82 82 78 94.S 9S.2S 101.8 101.8 !; 
1- JORDAN 32 ss 55 60.25 60.25 69.2S 72.85 
-· 
SOURCES: Milirary Balanu. USACDA (1972, 1975). 
a. For Egypt, Syria, and Israel, total military man power naturally is equivalent to the sum of thcir army, air force, and navy manpowers. Because of 
their small sizes, the navies of lraq and Jordan have been excluded from the analysis and their numbers of personnel are not oontained in this 
table. lnstead, total military manpower for these two oountries is given in the row headed ''TOTAL" which includes llaq•s and Jordan's small 
navies. 
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Arab figures are included in the analysis because it can be safely 
assumed that they are an important input into Israers defense 
decision-making. However, since there is little military coordi-
nation among Arab nations (Evron and Simantov, 1975), we do 
not expect a good fit f or aggregate Arab strength as ade pendent 
variable. The navies oflraqandJordan wereexcluded becauseof 
their minimal sizes. In addition to the five simple variants, 
models combining the individual effects of the military strength 
of the four Arab nations on Israeli force levels were estimated. 
Time lags in equation 2 were varied from one to three years, 
and all models corresponding to equation 5 were estimated with 
lags from zero to two years. Longer lags were not estimated as 
they would have reduced degrees of freedom below the required 
minimum. But in a situation characterized by the imminence of 
war,9 long lag times certainly are a luxury no one can afford. 
Since we have three sets of data for the second race (two for the 
first), three lags, two general models with 11 interpretations for 
army and air force, and seven interpretations f or total navy and 
major fighting ships, 432 equations had to be estimated f or the 
first race and 648 equations f or the second race. These numbers 
were slightly increased by estimating the models f or Israel by 
combining the individual effects of the Arab countries' forces 
with different lags for different countries. 
A major problem in the study oftime-series data is the danger 
of autocorrelation in the residuals from OLS regression. lt is 
aggravated by the fact that the routine Durbin-Watson test is, 
strictly speaking, not appropriate f or autoregressive models like 
2 and 5 (Kmenta, 1971: 295). In place of the Durbin-Watson 
ratio, first-order autocorrelation coefficients for OLS residuals 
are therefore given in Tables 4 and 5 together with the results of 
OLS estimation. Since these coefficierits tend to underestimate 
true autocorrelation (Hibbs, 1974: 292), a stringent criterion f or 
estimation by generalized least squares (GLS) regression was 
applied, and GLS reestimation with the standard transformation 
9. There are thoae who argue that Egypt'1 decision to 10 to war with Israel apin 
was taken as early as 1970 (Monroe and farrar-Hockley. 1975: S). 
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TABLE4 
Estimation Results on Reaction Patterns in the First Period, 1957-19678 
1.1 TANKJOt = 2.12 TANKJOt-1 + .21 TANKlSt-2 - 245 
(.45) (.09) (109) 
(2), N = 8, R 2 = .95, F • 45.3, SE• 14.5, A • -.03 
1.2 CTANK.JOl = 1.70 CTANKJOt-1+2.06 CTANKISt-1 - 2.61 CTANKlSt-2 - 117 
(.26) (.23) (.37) (96) 
(5), N = 8, R2 = .99, F"" 171.0, SE= 89.1 
1.3 PLANSYt • .48 PLANSYt-1 + .26 PLANl5t-1 - .20 PLANISt-2 + 21.7 
(.46) (.13) (.1 S) (17 .9) 
(5), N = 8, R2 = .91, F • 12.7, SE= 1.9, A = .03 
1.4 CPLANSYt = -.06 CPLANSYt-1 + .21 CPLANISt-3 + 6555 
(.52) (.06) (9288) 
(2), N • 7, R2 = .93, F • 25.5, SE= 7521 
1.5 CPLANISt = -.66 CPLANISt-1 + .45 CPLANARt-1 + 59259 
(. 75) (.12) (40187) 
(2), N • 9, R 2 = .98, F = 79.3, SE= 23529, A = -.01 
1.6 PLANISt = -.03 PLANISt-1 + .43 PLANEGi-1 + 85.4 
(.17) (.06) (56.2) 
(2), N • 9, R2 • .99, F = 115.5, SE= 3.3 
1.7 CSHIPEGt • .86 CSHIPEGt-1+2.34 CSHIPISt - 1.87 CSHIPISt-1 + 3.47 
(.20) (1.09) (1.32) (3.79) 
(5), N = 9, R2 = .93, F = 23.4, SE= 1.7 
1.8 CSHIPSYt = 1.30 CSHIPSYt-1 + .61 CSHIPISt - .SS CSHIPISt-1 - .44 
(.67) (.17) (.14) (1.07) 
(5), N = 9, R2 = .83, F = 8.2, SE• .3 
J.9 CSHIPARt = .89 CSHIPARt-1 + 2.91 CSHIPlst - 2.25 CSHIPISt-1 + 1.91 
(.23) (1.24) (1.50) (3.83) 
(5). N = 9, R2 = .92, F = 20.4,SE = 2.0 
1.10 CSHIPl8t • -.74CSHIPl8t-t+1.59 CSHIPSYt - 1.06 CSHIPSYt-1 +5.80 
{.37) (.SO)_ (.45) (2.93) 
(5), N • 9, R2 = .95, F = 17.3, SE= .2, A = -.10 
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1.11 CSHIPISt • .01 CSHIPl5t-1 + .17 CSHIPARt - .26 CSHIPAflt-1 + S.91 
(.SS) (.07) (.10) (4.72) 
(5), N • 9, R2 = .80, F • 6.S, SE= .4, A = .07 
a. The following conventions are used in this table: Standard errors of parameter 
estimates are given in parentheses. Variable labels are self-explanatory; the prefix 
"C" denotes capabilities. All variables in equations esthnated by G LS are marked by 
a prime. The first information in the line of summary statistics is whether a given 
equation isa variant of model 2 or of rnodel S. Then follow number of cases (N), R2, 
F, standard error of estimate (SE), and first-order autocorrelation of residuals in the 
case of equations estimated by 01.S (A). 
of data (Theil, 1971: 253; Hibbs, 1974: 268 f.) was performed 
whenever the autocorrelation coefficient for OLS turned out.to 
be above . ls.10 This was done regardless of the size of reaction 
terms in the OLS results because autocorrelation of residuals 
might conceal significant reactivity. 
As the purpose of this article is to identify reaction patterns 
in the Middle East, the discussion of empirical results will focus 
on best fitting models among those equations with a significant 
reaction term. Since degrees of freedom differ greatly between 
equations-due to varying numbers of cases and of explanatory 
variables-the significance of overall F-ratios and of regression 
coefficients has been used as a criterion for selecting best fitting 
models instead of the values of R2. Reactivity will only be said 
to prevail when both are significant at the .05 level. 
The use of these conventional criteria could be criticized on 
two accounts. First, arms race data might be considered as popu-
JO. Therc is, of course, some disagrcement within the discipline on the use of OLS 
venus GLS regression. In this discussion, proponcnts of the classic linear regression 
model have the procedural simplicity and the least variance properties of OLS estimates 
on their side. lf, on the other band, the assumptions of the classical model are violated 
by the presence of autocorrelated disturbances-as is often tbe case in the analysis of 
dynamic models-OLS results and tbe causal inferences derived from them tend to be 
heavily distorted as has been amply demonstrated by Hibbs (1974). Since first-order 
autocorrelation was above . 1 S in more than three-fourths of the OLS regressions run with 
the Middle East data, the application of GLS is clcarly indicated in the prcsent case. 
lt should be noted, incidentally, that GLS transformations were performed without 
ignoring scalars so that the summary statistics for OLS and GLS results are comparable 
(ffibbs, 1974: 269). 
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lation rather than sample data, and second, there might be a 
probabilistic problem if several hundred equations are estimated. 
However, these arguments overlook the fact that capabi1ities can 
be measured, at least in principle, at arbitrary intervals, and the 
fact that no more than three equations (which are identical except 
f or the lag parameter) are estimated from the same subset of data. 
Standard statisticaJ criteria therefore seem adequate. 
TllE FIRST RACE: 1956 TO 1967 
The general format in presenting an overview of reaction 
processes in the M iddle East will be to proceed from one service 
to the next. For each service, OLS results on reactivity will be 
reported and their modification by GLS reestimation afterwards 
discussed. Best fitting equations with significant reaction terms 
are reproduced in Table 4 and graphically summarized in 
Figure 1. 
For tank inventories and capabilities, OLS regression shows 
two nations to have reacted to other countries with the build-up 
of their tank forces. Israel is seen as reacting to tank capabili-
ties of Egypt and Jordan and to the inventory of Jordan. Inven-
tory and capability of J ordan's tank forces have been influenced 
by those of Israel. Equation 1.1, which links Jordan's tank 
inventory to that of Israel, holds up under G LS estimation as 
autocorrelation of residuals is very Iow. 
Whereas the reaction process manifested by J ordan's tank 
inventory is better described by model 2, 5 is superior for tank 
capabilities. Because of strong autocorrelation (-.74), GLS 
transf ormation has to be performed, which leads to equation 1.2. 
This equation might suggest that Jordan did not feel very much 
threatened by the capability of Israel's armored forces since she 
would accept an annual increase in CT ANKIS up to about 27% 
(l. = 1.27) without upgrading her own tank f orce in response. A 
more sensible explanation is probably f ound in the constraints 
on the supply of modern armor that Jordan experienced through 
the Jate fifties and early sixties (SIPRI, 1971: 539-545). 
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A high degree of autocorrelation in all OLS regressions with 
lsrael's tank inventories and capabilities calls for GLS reestima-
tion which virtually wipes out all significant coefficients in the 
equations for lsraelts tank inventory. With Israeli tank capa-
bilities, the only significant coefficient is that of the autoregres-
sive term. As has been stressed earlier, one should not jump to 
conclusions about bureaucratic momentum. 
For the air force component of the first Middle East arms 
race, we find the number of Syrian combat aircraft depending 
primarily upon the increase in Israel's aircraft inventory. Equa-
tion 1.3 suggests that the number of Syrian combat aircraft 
would have declined sharply had it not been for the Israeli air 
force build-up. lt moreover reveals the drastic extent of Syrian 
reactivity to Israel~ since only an annual reduction of Israel's 
inventory by about 22% could have brought the Syrian response 
down to zero. 
The capability of Syria's air force has likewise increased as a 
reaction to that of the Israeli air f orce. This increase is shown 
by equation 1.4 which was obtained from a GLS transforma-
tion of variables because of strong autocorrelation (-.41) in its 
OLS equivalent. A plausible reason f or the Iong lag in the Syrian 
response is the difficulty which she bad experienced in obtain-
ing weaponry from the late fifties to the mid-sixties owing to her 
oscillations towards and away from the Soviet Union. 
For Syria's adversary, OLS analysis reveals only one signifi-
cant relationship~ namely, that the capability of Israers air 
force is a response to the combined capability ofthe air forces of 
Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and Syria (equation 1.5). 11 The negative 
"' sign of b1 certainly leaves a discomf orting impression, but since 
this coefficient is not significant this matter will not be pursued 
here. GLS reestimation leads to the discovery of an additional 
interesting feature of lsrael's air f orce build-up by establishing 
11. In bis study of aircraft capahilities from 1949 to 1968, Mihalka (1975) detects 
virtually no Arab·Israeli reaction patterns from 1949 to 1968. As has becn pointed out 
earlier, this might wcll be duc to the fact that he lumps data from two raccs togcther. 
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a highly visible link between the numbers of combat aircraft in 
the Israeli and the Egyptian inventories ( equation 1.6). 12 
Turning now to the naval race, three remarkable observa-
tions have to be reported. The first is that reaction pattems f or 
total navies and for "major ships" are almost identical. Ca-
pability scores f or the total Egyptian navy ( equation 1. 7), for the 
Syrian navy (equation 1.8), and for their combined navies(equa-
tion 1.9) display significant reactivity to the capability of the 
Israeli navy, which, in turn, is a responsetothecapabilities ofthe 
Syrian (equation 1.10) and of the combined Arab navies (equa-
tion l.ll). For major ships the pattern is exactly the same-
with the exception that the Syrian inventory is more important 
f or Israel's reaction than f or its capability. The separation of 
"major ships" from total navies thus is not meaningful f or the 
first race, and equations for "major ships" are not reproduced 
in Table 4. 
The second noteworthy point is the complete identity of OLS 
and GLS results. In the case of Israel, there is little autocorrela-
tion, but for the capability scores of the Egyptian, Syrian, and 
combined Arab navies first-order autocorrelation of OLS-
residuals is strong, so that reestimation by GLS could have led 
to very different findings. 
Finally, equations 1.7through1.11 allareofthe generalform S 
which suggests that changes in naval strength have been a more 
salient and sensitive feature than absolute capabilities. Further-
more, equations f or Egypt, Syria, and their combined navies are 
of the "runaway" type, since Israel would have bad to disarm by 
from 10% to 30% annually to force their reaction down to zero. 
12. Hibbs (1974: 302) maintains rathcr apodictically that GLS reestimation of 
dynamic modcls would gcncrally decrease the importance of autoregrcssive tcnns and 
increase tbat of otber variables. The case of lsraers and Egypt's aircraft inventories is 
the only spectacular empirical evidence 1 could find to support tbis assertion. Generally. 
however, GLS reestimation eliminatcs many significant OLS findings on reactivity 
together with those on "momcntum." 
13. Fora more extensive treatment of the estimation of arms race models from vcry 
short series of data, see Rattinger (1976). 
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The same is true f or Israel's response to Syria's naval strength. 
As to the combined capabilities of Arab navies, however, Israel 
appears to have been willing to accept quite substantial increases 
without its own countermoves. 
THE SECOND RACE: 1967TO1973 
In the second race, we will Iook f or reaction patterns not only 
in inventory and capability, but also in manpower data. The 
major problem with the period from 1967 to 1973 is the Iow 
number of cases. 13 Values of R2 are therefore less meaningful 
than f or the first race, and we will have to rely even more on 
F-ratios, regression coefficients, and their standard errors to 
discern reactivity. Best fitting equations with significant reaction 
terms are reproduced in Table 5 and graphically summarized in 
Figure 2. 
With OLS regression we find that Iraq is the only Arab coun-
try that-in the manpower data-shows some response to 
Israel's ground f orces, but this exception vanishes with G LS. 
Israel, on the other hand, seems to have been especially con-
cerned about the inventories ( equation 2. l) and the qualitative 
upgrading (equation 2.3) of the combined Arab tank forces. 
Isolating the f our Arab countries surprisingly reveals the lraqi 
tank inventory (equation 2.2) and the manpower of Iraq's army 
(equation 2.4) as particularly strong determinants for the ex-
pansion of the Israeli army. 
For air force capabilities and inventories a strange finding 
emerges. In contrast to the first race, there is only one significant 
reaction term for post-1967 air force inventories and none for 
capabilities. This only exception, moreover, which sees Israel 
responding to the aircraft inventory of the Jordanian air force, 
vanishes when GLS regression is applied. We are thus left with 
the impression that Israeli responses to the air f orce build-up of 
her adversaries show up only in manpower data. GLS reestima-
tion eliminates a significant OLS finding on Israeli reactivity to 
Syrian air force manpower, whereas the relationships to 
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TABLE 5 
Estimation Results on Reaction Patterns in the Second Period, 196 7-l 973a 
No. Equatlon 
2.1 TANKISt • .15 TANKISt-1 + .24 TANKARt-1 + 338 
(.49) (.09) (355) 
(2), N = 6, R2 = .90, F • 14.2, SE• 130, A = -.11 
2.2 TANKl8t = .41TANK18t-l+1.34 TANKIRt-1 - 184 
(.35) (.39) (261) 
(2), N • 6, R2 • .93, F • 19.9, SE• 111, A • -.03 
2.3 CTANKIS. = .10 CTANKISt-1 + .24CTANX.ARt-1+1278 
(.43) (.07) (1198) 
(2), N = 6, R 2 = .92, F = 16.8, SE= 582, A c: -.06 
2.4 ARMISt = .00 ARMIS.-1 + 2.20 ARMIRt-3 - 94.S 
(.22) (.01) (49.5) 
(2), N „ 4, R2 • 1.00, F = 408.4, SE= .6, A =.OS 
2.S AIRISt = -.01 AIRISt-1 + .28 AIRARt-1 - 1.74 
(.64) (.12) (4.36) 
(2), N = 6, R2 = .93, F = 20.9, SE= 2.7 
2.6 AIRISt • .11 AIRIS(-1 + .59 AJREG~-2 - 1.23 
(.49) (.15) (1.3S) 
(2), N = 5, a2 = .98, F • 48.4, SE• .9 
2.7 CSHIPISt • -.29CSHIPISt-1+1.68 CSHIPEGt-2 + 49.4 
(.15) (.25) (13.3) 
(2), N = S, R2 = .97, F = 33.5, SE= .6, A = .10 
2.8 CSHIPISt = .13 CSHIPISt-1+3.44 CSHIPSY~-2 - 4.SS 
(.12) (.49) (2.92) 
(2), N = S, R2 = .99, F = 98.9, SE= .9 
2.9 BIGSHIPSYt = 1.Sl BIGSHIPSYt-1 + .21 BIGSHIPISt-2 - 5.98 
(.09) (.02) (4.36) 
(2), N = S, a2 = 1.00, F = 632.6, SE= .1, A = .01 
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TADLE S (Continued) 
2.10 CBIGSHIPSYt • 1.89 CBIGSHIPSYt-1 + .11 CBIGSHIPISt-2 - 2.12 
(.03) (.01) (.29) 
(2), N = S, R2 = 1.00, F = 883.S, SE• .01, A •.OS 
2.11 BIGSHIPIS( • .02 BIGSHIPISt-1 + 2.48 BIGSHIPSYt-2 - 11.52 
(.13) (.3S) (8.01) 
(2), N • S, R. 2 • .99, F • 6S.8, SE = 1.3 
2.12 CBIGSHIPISt • .01 CBIGSHIPISt-1 + S.14 CBIGSHIPSYt-2 - 4.16 
(.10) (.65) (3.97) 
(2), N • 5, R2 • .99, F • 116.6, SE• .6 
a. The following conventions are usecl in thi1 table: standud errors of panmeter 
estimates are given in puenthe1es. Variable labels are telf~xplanatory; the prefix 
"C" denotes capabilities. All variables in equations estimated by G LS are marked by 
a prime. The fJrst inf ormation in the line of summary statistics is whether a given 
equation is a variant of moclel 2 or of model S. Then follow number of ca1es (N), R2, 
F, stanclard error of estimate (SE), ancl first~rder autocorrelation of residuals in the 
cate of equations estimated by OLS (A). 
Egyptian (equation 2.6) and total Arab air force manpower 
(equation 2.5) survive. 
In the first race, OLS and GLS produce similar results for the 
categories of ships and major ships. This is quite different f or the 
second race. OLS regression shows total Arab navy manpowcr to 
bc a response to Israeli navy manpower. The number of Isracl's 
ships is seen as a rcaction to Egyptian and to total Arab inven-
tories, and the capability score of lsrael's navy is determined by 
the capabilitics of the Egyptian and Syrian navies and by their 
combined capability. Only the relationship between Israeli and 
Egyptian naval capabilities (equation 2.7), however, is close to 
being undistorted by autocorrelation, and, with one further 
exception, all reaction patterns disappear in GLS reestimation. 
This exception views the qualitative upgrading of Israel's navy as 
the result of a similar build-up of Syrian naval f orces { equation 
2.8). 
Tuming to "major ships," we again find a very "dense" 
pattern of interaction in OLS results. The Syrian and combined 
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Arab navies respond to the number and capability of Israel's 
major naval units. Israel in turn reacts to the capabilities of 
Egyptian and Syrian major ships and to their combined capa-
bility as weil as to the number of Syrian major ships. Apart 
from Syria's reactions to Israel (equations 2.9 and 2.10), 
all findings are heavily distorted by autocorrelation and 
have tobe reestimated. This eliminates all reactive relationships 
but lsrael's response to the major ship inventory ( equation 
2.11) and capability (equation 2.12) of Syria. Hence separation 
of major ships from the remainder of the Middle Eastern navies 
has enabled us to identify a missile-boat race between Syria and 
Israel as the "hard core" ofthe post-1967 naval race. 
Conclusion 
In addition to summarizing, the purpose of this concluding 
section is to compare the structure of action-reaction processes 
in both Middle Eastern arms races and to point to some sub-
stantive implications of the analysis and to areas of interest for 
future research. Comparisons of results can be made across arms 
races, countries, services and weapon systems, indicators, and 
models. Let us begin with the first two issues. 
The term "arms race" is more appropriate f or the period from 
1956 to 1967 thanfortheyears precedingthe Yom Kippurwar. In 
this latter period only Israel is seen as reacting to the Arab 
nations' armaments, whereas Arab reaction occurs only in the 
Israeli-Syrian missile-boat race. One reason f or the absence of 
reactivity in the Arab camp after 1967 might have been the early 
decision to go to war again so that at least Egypt and Syria and 
probably lraq took whatever weaponry they could get-regard-
less of Israeli behavior. In that sense the absence of reactivity 
might f oreshadow aggression. 
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For the individual Arab countries a number of interesting 
results emerge. Apart from the navy build-up in the first period, 
Egypt never reacted to Israel, whereas Israel feit challenged 
throughout by at least some part of Egyptian armaments. Iraq 
was entirely isolated from interaction patterns in the first period. 
The same held true for Jordan in the second period when Iraq's 
armored contingents were of major concern to Israel. As pre-
dicted, Israel did in f act in some cases respond to aggregate Arab 
inventories, capabilities, and manpower, whereas all findings on 
reactivity in the opposite direction vanish when the effects of 
autocorrelation are removed. 
Tuming to services and major weapon systems, we can 
examine Huntington's ( 1958) assertion that arms races will f ocus 
on "dominant" weapon systems. Empirical evidence in the 
Middle Eastem case seems ambiguous. Depending upon the 
definition of a "dominant" weapon system, we should expect 
either the first race to be f or tanks and the second f or combat 
aircraft or both races to be f or aircraft. What we find is that air-
craft inventories and capabilities are more reaction-prone bef ore 
1967, whereas in the post-1967 period tanks are more likely to 
give rise to reactivity than aircraft. For naval f orces, however, 
Huntington's hypothesis seems to be borne out by the data. 
Bef ore 1967 no single system dominates the naval race, but after-
wards the main object of competition is clearly the missile-
equipped fast patrol boat. These results might be taken as some 
indication that the more we disaggregate overall military pos-
tures the more likely we are to come up with reaction patterns 
that are not only statistically significant but also correspond to 
the decisional calculus of the relevant political and military elites. 
As to different indicators of military power, we can con-
clude that capability and manpower data help identify reaction 
patterns that would have gone unnoticed in inventories. The 
largest number of significant interactive processes is discernible 
in the capability data. In this context a promising development of 
the present approach should be the combination of inventory or 
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manpower with capability indices in the same model. In this 
way frequently heard hypotheses about Israel's attempting to 
offset quantitative Arab superiority by quality could be empiri-
cally assessed. 
Not even a preliminary judgment is possible on the relative 
confirmation of our two models. For the first race there is a rough 
balance. The ''blind" model (2) is more appropriate f or tanks and 
combat aircraft; the "anticipating'' model {5) proves superior for 
the naval race. Just like the longer lags this might be due to the 
comparatively long time elapsing between the decision to acquire 
a new naval system and its operational status. For the second 
race, however, model 5 is either inferior or inapplicable because 
it eliminates degrees of freedom. 
lt seems possible, on the other band, to answer the question 
whether the treatment of economic constraints and the exclusion 
of Richardson's ••grievance'" term in models l, 3, and 4 are ade-
quate. With respect to "grievance" we are on safe ground since 
almost no regression constant is significantly different from zero. 
The coefficients of the autoregressive terms vary from negative 
to far above unity, but there seems to be a systematic pattem. 
IA A 
With one exception, b1 and b1 are weil below one for Israel which 
suggests the presence of strong economic constraints. For her 
Arab adversaries b1 and b3 are consistently in the neighborbood 
of one or markedly higher. lt might be that the growth of their 
armaments is not so much constrained by economic than by 
other factors. lt might also be that the burden of the arms race 
affects them in a more complex way than expressed in our 
models. 
Just like the empirical determination oflagstructures-instead 
of a priori specification-and the presence in some cases of more 
than one equally well fitting equation for Israel, this reliance 
on data analysis might draw criticism f or being atheoretical and 
purely descriptive. Since there is, however, no substantive theory 
of Middle East arms races-and it is doubtful whether such a 
6'theory" would deserve the name-this criticism is exaggerated. 
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If one wants to write a comprehensive descriptive history of 
interactive armament policies in the Middle East there is no need 
for arms race models. If one is interested in the extent to which 
the general notion of systematic reactive armaments behavior 
can help to explain the military build-ups in the Middle East, the 
present study should be of some use. 
Whether the Richardsonian hypothesis can claim some 
explanatory value or just leads to useless curve-fitting exercises 
might be ascertained by tracking beyond 1967 and 1973 those 
equations with a significant interaction term. Together with 
investigations of the role of intraorganizational and intrasocietal 
factors and the influence of constraints and stimuli external to 
the Middle East subsystem, this matter has to be reversed f or 
future research. As of now we can only say that reaction proc-
esses in the Middle East as modelled here are but one of many 
determinants of armament levels and that they are not very 
stable. Maybe some of the reaction patterns identified in this 
study are irrelevant or spurious, and maybe in reality there are 
others which are not adequately grasped by either model. Unfor-
tunately, the constraints on more complex modellingaresosevere 
in the case of the Middle East that we will probably have to live 
with rather rudimentary knowledge of the driving and restraining 
f orces behind the accumulation of arms in that part of the world. 
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